One of the pervasive problems with means-tested public long-term care programs is their inability to prevent individuals who could afford private long-term services from taking advantage of public care. They often manage to elude the means-test net through 'strategic impoverishment'. We show in a simple model how this problem comes about, how it affects welfare and how it can be mitigated.
INTRODUCTION
Long-term care (LTC) is the provision of assistance and services to people who, because of disabling illnesses or conditions, have limited ability to perform basic daily activities such as bathing and preparing meals. As life expectancy increases, the demand for LTC services by the elderly population is likely to increase dramatically in the future. There are two related reasons for this. First, LTC needs start to rise exponentially from around the age of 80 years old; second, the number of persons aged 80 years and above are growing faster than any other segment of the population. As a consequence, the number of dependent elderly is expected to more than double by 2050 in most of the countries. This will exacerbate the current pressures on the demand for LTC services and lead to new challenges for these countries and their governments. 1 There are, currently, three institutions that finance and provide LTC services: the family, the market, and the state. The majority of the dependent population receiving LTC at home rely exclusively on assistance from family members, mainly women; this is often referred to as 'informal care'. This avenue for LTC provision is, unfortunately, facing a number of formidable challenges: drastic changes in family values, increasing number of childless households, mobility of children and growing rate of market activity on the part of women (particularly those aged 50-65). As a consequence, the number of dependent elderly who will not be able to count on the assistance of family members is likely to increase.
1.
For surveys on LTC and more details on these estimates, see Cremer et al. (2012) and Grabowski et al. (2012) .
This creates a pressing demand for public provision of LTC services and the appropriate design of these transfers is an important issue. While LTC systems in the OECD are very heterogeneous, means-tested systems seem to prevail in the majority of countries. The best known and the most studied of them is the Medicaid program in the US, which covers about half of the LTC provision for the American elderly dependents. 2 It is well known that means-testing is associated with a number of problems, including limited take-up, poverty traps created by high effective marginal tax rates, and stigmatization (see e.g. Currie and Gahvari, 2008) . 3 It is nevertheless often adopted over universal arrangements because it reduces the cost of the program and allows devoting scarce funds to those who need them the most.
In this paper, we focus on a different problem created by means-testing or rather by its (lack of) enforcement, namely that individuals who could afford paying for their LTC end up receiving benefits from the program. In other words, means testing is not always strictly enforced and this has ramification which have hitherto received little attention. As argued by Warshawsky (2014) , in many states, an elderly person may own a home valued at $802,000, plus home furnishings, jewelry and an automobile of uncapped value while receiving longterm Medicaid support. In addition, they are allowed to have various life-insurance policies, retirement accounts with unlimited assets and a defined-benefit pension plan. By most standards, such a person would be considered wealthy. 4 A related problem is that, some individuals game the system by arranging complex asset transfers or insurance transactions that sidestep efforts to curb fraud. There is a range of strategies that lead the beneficiaries to impoverish themselves so as to be eligible. This is called in the US as the Medicaid impoverishment technique. 5 As pointed out by Matthews (2014) 'there is a legal specialty known as "elder care attorneys" who help families hide grandma's assets so she can qualify for Medicaid'. Another reason why Medicaid and other social assistance schemes do not benefit low incomes as much as one could expect is that these programs seem to favor aid to people who are institutionalized and are unable after a few years to meet their financial obligations.
To understand how the strategic impoverishment can be orchestrated, it is useful to have a closer look at the design and application of the Medicaid program. To qualify for Medicaid coverage for LTC services, individuals must meet certain financial and functional eligibility criteria. Specifically individuals must be diagnosed dependent and have assets that fall below established standards, which vary across states. Individuals might divest themselves of their assets by transferring them to their family members in order to establish financial eligibility for Medicaid coverage. However, those who transfer assets for less than 'fair 2. According to Calmus (2013) , in the US, government programs currently account for 63% of LTC funding, with Medicaid paying for 40% and Medicare paying for 23% in the form of post-acute care. 3. Within the context of LTC, Norton (1995) for instance argues that some households who could benefit from Medicaid prefer not to do so by fear of stigmatization. 4. For the legal and tax ramification of Medicaid for LTC see: Goetting and Schumaker (2014) . 5. Not to be confused with the so-called the Spousal Impoverishment Law, which changes the Medicaid eligibility requirement for couples in situations where only one spouse needs nursing home care. It allows the spouse remaining at home to protect a portion of income and resources. market value' during a specified 'look-back' period, that is either 36 or 60 months, depending on the type of asset, may incur a penalty, which is a period of non-eligibility. In reality, there are a number of exceptions to this rule and it is not strictly enforced in all states (see Johnson, 2013; Wiener et al., 2013; GAO, 2015) . As these studies show, evidence on the extent to which individuals transfer assets to become eligible for LTC is generally limited and often based on anecdotes. These include frequent commercial by lawyers offering their service to elderly people to 'protect' their estate in case of dependency. Indeed, when transfers take place sufficiently early, the Medicaid means-test can be bypassed without any risk of detection or penalty. A significant feature of the system with regard to this impoverishment strategy is the (im)possibility of recouping part of what has been paid by the government at the time of death. A related issue is that children be asked to finance their parents LTC expenses before the government intervenes. The law varies on that and so does the degree to which it is enforced. To take the example of France where there are two means-tested programs for LTC, the Prestation Sp ecifique D ependance (PSD) and the Allocation Personalis ee d'Autonomie (APA), the first one can recuperate its participation on the estate of the beneficiary, whereas the second cannot. In Germany and Belgium, the concept of means is extended to the children, as they are partially responsible for the caring of their parents.
The crucial point is that for some reason, there very often appears to be a significant political resistance against the effective enforcement of some aspects of the means test when the underlying program concerns dependent people. Attempts by the French PSD to recuperate expenses from the estate of a person who has benefited for years from means-tested services are perceived as unpopular by the majority of public opinion. 6 In reality the rate of recovery is extremely low but quite ironically, the very hypothetical threat of recovery has lead to a quite low take-up rate in France. This has induced the government to introduce the APA where such a requirement is not imposed. 7 To sum up, the possibility to make transfers to children along with the difference to hold children responsible undermines the effectiveness of means-testing. Observing the parents' wealth is then not sufficient to assess their effective ability to pay for LTC services. This is particularly true when parents are altruistic. From the parents' perspective a suitably timed inter vivos transfer then has a 'double dividend'. First, it anticipates on the bequest they want to leave anyway and second, it puts them in a position to qualify for the means-tested program. 6. As another example, we could cite the case of Georgia' state recovery. This is a program, required by federal law, whereby Medicaid members with qualified assets reimburse the taxpayers for LTC and home and community-based services provided through Medicaid. Funds are recovered from the member's estate, after death, for the cost of these services. However, no action to recover assets (including homes or property) will be taken while the member, member's spouse or qualified children are living in the home. Estates valued under $25,000 will not be subject to recovery. https://dch.georgia.gov/sites/dch.georgia.gov/files/imported/vgn/images/portal/cit_1210/39/ 35/53166441Estate_Recovery_FAQ.pdf. 7. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/rapports/r2971.asp. This paper presents a simple model which shows how this problem of strategic impoverishment comes about, how it affects welfare and how it can be mitigated. 8 It takes a normative viewpoint and studies the provision of a social LTC in a setting of asymmetric information between the families and the government. We analyze three approaches that can be combined. The first one relies purely on a process of self-selection. Since, by assumption, private resources cannot supplement the LTC benefit, if its quantity/quality is not very high, those with enough resources or with family support will be deterred from using the means-tested scheme. In other words, to achieve self-selection a lower than otherwise optimal level of LTC is provided and this has of course welfare cost.
Second, we introduce the possibility that individual types (before transfer wealth) can be observed at some cost (through some kind of audit technology). This possibility relaxes the self-selection constraint and thus mitigates the welfare cost of asymmetric information. The optimal policy balances this benefit against the cost of the audits. The third approach consists in taxing intergenerational transfers (and specifically inter vivos gifts). Such a tax has the effect of facilitating the enforcement of means test. However, it also restricts parents' ability to help their needy children.
We assume throughout the paper that public care cannot be 'topped up'. This admittedly applies only to part of public LTC programs. Publicly provided home care can easily be supplemented by informal care. However, this is more difficult when it comes to institutional care. This represents only part of the reality. It is relevant, though, when dependency arises because of cognitive diseases like Altzheimer. And it is precisely this type of dependency which brings about the major financial concern for the decades to come. It concerns mainly the 80+ age group, the size of which is projected to increase dramatically. Ultimately all of these patients will need institutional care, unless of course they die of other causes before they reach the more severe stages of their disease. 9 We adopt the simplest setting that allows us to represent the problem's main features. There are two types of families. The first type, labeled altruistic, consists of a parent and a child who share the same welfare function. The second type, labeled selfish, is composed of a parent and a child who have no links. We assume away private insurance for LTC. The altruistic family is assumed to be relatively well off. The crucial idea represented in our model is that individual wealth may not be observable because parents can transfer part of it to their children. This complicates the implementation of means-tested programs. In other words, the meanstest is based on the parent's reported level of their own wealth. However, only the wealth left after a possible transfer to their children is observable.
Given this specification, in case of dependency, altruistic parents will get a good level of LTC because of their own resources or the aid from their child. The selfish parent is poor, so that without government intervention he will be in very bad shape in case of dependence.
8. We do not use the term strategic the way Bernheim et al. (1985) used it in their non-cooperative game between parents and children. Here the parent and the child cooperate to get benefits that are not aimed at them. 9. See Angelini and Laferr ere (2008) for the residential mobility of elderly.
We concentrate on the provision of public LTC financed through some form of taxation. All other taxes are taken as given (the income and wealth levels considered are already net of these taxes). In case of perfect information, the government will only help the poor dependent. Assume now that the government does not observe who is altruistic and who is not, nor the resources of the parents. The altruistic dependent parent can now claim to be poor and obtain public LTC benefits by giving his assets to his child or alternatively forego any assistance from his children. Consequently the full information solution is no longer feasible and one has to resort to a second-best policy such as those studied in this paper.
THE BASIC MODEL
We consider a society consisting of an equal number of two types of families indexed i=A and S for altruist and selfish. In each type, the child has an income m i and consumes c i , which gives him a utility u(c i ); the parent is dependent and has an income (or wealth) w i and enjoys a level of care m i , which gives him a utility u (m i ). For simplicity, we assume that dependency occurs with probability 1. Also for simplicity we posit that the utility functions are the same in the two states of nature. Allowing for a lower and more realistic probability would not change the main results. For the similar reasons, we use the same utility function for the child and his dependent parent and assume u(0)=0. In an altruistic family, the parent and the child use total resources y A +w A to finance both the consumption c A and the care m A so that c A =m A =(y A +w A )/2. In a selfish family, one simply has c S =y S and m S =w S .
A utilitarian government with unrestricted tools and full information would set c A =m A =c S =m S =(y A +w A +y S +w S )/4. All levels of consumption and care are equalized within and between families. In reality, tools are limited and individual types are not common knowledge. We now turn to a setting with restricted tools and asymmetric information.
PUBLIC POLICY WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Assume now that the utilitarian government can only use a flat tax s on all incomes to finance a public LTC g. For simplicity, we assume that w S =y S =0. 10 The government's problem is then given by
In words, the poor selfish parents receive a level of public care which is exactly equal to the private care enjoyed by the wealthier altruistic parents.
10. If y S and w S are positive, we have
where Y=w A +w S +y A +y S and c A =m A . This is of no relevance to our results as long as w S is not too large.
Let us consider to the case where types are not publicly observable. It is then tempting for the altruistic family to claim that the parent is resourceless and entitled to receiving g. By assumption if he gets g, he cannot combine it with other type of resources. In other words, topping up of public benefits is not possible. 11 The government's problem is then subject to the following self-selection constraint stating that the altruists are better off telling the truth than mimicking the selfish dependent.
2u
If this constraint is binding it can we written as
Equation (2) implicitly defines g as a function of c, g ¼ĝðcÞ. The functional form ofĝðcÞ depends on the degree of the concavity of u, through the term 2u (c)Àu(2c). To illustrate this assume that u(x)=x (1Àɛ) /(1Àɛ). Then one haŝ
which yieldsĝðcÞ ¼ 0 for ɛ=0 andĝðcÞ ¼ c for ɛ=∞. Differentiating the RHS of this expression shows thatĝ increases with the concavity parameter ɛ and with c. The Lagrangian expression associated with the problem of the utilitarian government is then given by
where we have used the assumption that u(c S )=u(y S )=0 and where u(c)=u(c A )=u (m A ), while u(g)=u(m S ); k is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the self selection constraint while l is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint. so that m A >m S =g. In words, to satisfy the self-selection constraint, public care is lower than private care (in altruistic family). Asymmetric information penalizes the selfish dependent to the benefit of the altruists. It is worth noting that this 11. This assumption is discussed in Jousten et al. (2005). result is independent of the way resources are divided between w A and y A . This will no longer be the case with taxation of gifts.
Observe that here and throughout the paper we assume perfect altruism for simplicity. When parents put a lower weight on their child's utility than on their own, the LHS of condition (1) would change because parents now consume more than half of total resources (as long as gifts remain positive). This would affect the subsequent expressions, but the basic result that the level of public care has to be reduced for incentive reasons would continue to go through. The same is true when children and parents have different utility functions.
AUDITS
We now introduce the possibility of (random) audits at some cost. An audit is supposed to reveal individual types. In our context this means that it shows if strategic impoverishment has taken place or not. If someone can afford paying for his own LTC and nevertheless benefit from g, he will have to pay a penalty φg where φ>1 if audited. The probability of audit is p. Then, we write the selfselection constraint as:
Auditing is costly. The cost depends on the frequency of audit p and is denoted k(p) We have thus to modify the revenue constraint as follows:
where k 0 (p)>0 and k 00 (p)>0. 12 As usual we have a convex cost function.
We now have a new Lagrangian:
£ 2 ¼2uðcÞ þ uðgÞ À lðg þ 2c À y A À w A þ kðpÞÞ þ k 2uðcÞ À uðgÞ À ð1 À pÞuð2cÞ À pu 2c À ug ð Þ ½ :
This yields the following FOC's:
@L 2 @g ¼ u 0 ðgÞ À l À k½u 0 ðgÞ À pu 0 ð2c À ugÞu @L 2 @p ¼ Àlk 0 ðpÞ þ k½uð2cÞ À uð2c À ugÞ:
@L 2 @c ¼ u 0 ðcÞ À l þ k u 0 ðcÞ À ð1 À pÞu 0 ð2cÞ À pu 0 ð2c À ugÞ ½
The parameter φ is given; if it could be freely chosen, one would go back to the first-best solution. The same would hold if audits were free. In general, we have 12. We here assume that k(p) and φ are chosen in such a way that we have an interir solution.
Means-tested LTC and family transfers
These rules suggest that the possibility of audits tends to lead to a more generous level of g. To be more precise, the gap between c=m A (the level of care received by the wealthy altruist) and g (the level of care of the poor selfish) is lower, at least for given levels of the multipliers l and k. To see this, combining equations (3) and (4) and noting that setting p=0 (or φ=0) brings us back to the no audit case we have
With p or φ equal to 0, u 0 (g)=l/(1Àk). With p=1, or φ sufficiently large, u 0 (g)=l.
Note that all these comparisons are based on rules; since the multipliers are endogenous we cannot compare the actual levels.
To sum up, audits which disclose strategic impoverishment can be used as a (partial) substitute to the degradation of public care which is otherwise necessary to properly target the benefits (in a self-selecting way). The results obtained so far are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With asymmetric information as to the types of individuals, the second best policy implies that the publicly provided level of LTC is lower than otherwise optimal. Consequently, the dependent parent, who cannot count on his child's aid, is penalized compared to the dependent parents who benefit from the aid of their altruistic child. This handicap is mitigated if audits are introduced and are not too expensive. The optimal audits policy balances the benefits of relaxing the incentive constraint against audit costs. When it implies a positive audit probability, the level of public LTC can be set at a higher level than in the absence of auditing.
TAXATION OF GIFTS
We now turn to the case where inter vivos gifts can be taxed. Descending gifts occur when altruistic parents are richer than their children which is the case on which we now concentrate. We posit that these gifts made by wealthy parents to their children can be subjected to some linear tax h. Denoting by B the gift, the altruistic family has to solve the following problem: max uðy A ð1 À sÞ þ Bð1 À hÞÞ þ uðw A ð1 À sÞ À BÞ which yields the optimal value of B that is denoted by B * and that is dependent on both h and s. The FOC is: D ¼ u 0 ðc A Þð1 À hÞ À u 0 ðm A Þ ¼ 0 and then:
where R R is relative risk aversion and D B is the SOC of the above problem. This expression shows that the tax can decrease or increase the level of the gift. Intuitively one might at first expect the tax to reduce the level of the gift. However, as any price change, a variation of the gift tax creates both a substitution and an income effect. The gift tax has a positive effect on the level of gift if the concavity of utility (relative risk aversion or complementarity between c A and m A ) is big enough. Clearly if c and m were perfect substitutes there would be no gift as soon as h>0. To the contrary if they were perfect complements, gifts would be adjusted to compensate for the tax loss. 13 More specifically expression (5) shows that the threshold level of R R above which the gift increases with the tax is larger than 1. Consequently, with a log utility for which R R =1 we have dB * /dh<0. 14 The Lagrangian expression is now given by
where B * =B * (s,h). Observe that the mimicking altruists transfer their entire wealth to their children to qualify for public LTC. Recall that the mimicked type S individuals have no resources. This of course reflects the idea of strategic impoverishment which is at the heart of this paper. To make the presentation simple, we further assume that s is given; in other words, there is only one way to finance a variation in g, through a tax on gifts. The FOC's with respect to g and h can be written as follows:
wherec A ¼ y A ð1 À sÞ þ w A ð1 À sÞð1 À hÞ is the children's consumption in case of mimicking and
the elasticity of bequests with respect to the tax rate. Naturally we havec A [ c A .
13. To illustrate this in the simplest possible way, take the extreme case where y A =0 and s=0. Under perfect complementarity we then obtain w A ÀB=B(1Àh), so that B=w A /(2Àh) which increases with h. 14. Except when y A =0, in which case we have c A =B(1Àh) and dB * /dh=0. To interpret these equations, we proceed in different steps. Let us first assume that mimicking is not possible because types are observable (k=0). We then have a simple formula
so that c A Sg iff gT0 In words, if the effect of the tax on gifts is negative (positive), the level of consumption of the altruistic child will be larger (smaller) than the level of public care received by the selfish parent. Remember that c A <m A as long as h > 0. Put differently, when g has the 'expected' sign (namely negative) we continue to have a quality degraded public care. However, when gifts increase with the tax, the result might be reversed so that public care would exceed private care. Recall that we are in the case where types are observable (so that self-selection is not an issue).
We now reintroduce the self-selection constraint but assume that the tax on gifts is non-distortionary. That is, it is not proportional to B but lump-sum and denoted h. The family utility of the altruists is now given by uðy A ð1 À sÞ þ BÞ þ uðw A ð1 À sÞ À B À hÞ; and the FOC is
In that case we have
This implies that g<c A =m A , given that c A \c A . In other words we return to the case where quality of public care is degraded as compared to private care.
Let us now turn to the general case with both a binding incentive constraint and a distortionary gift tax. Combining the FOCs (6) and (7) and rearranging yields
While equation (8) is rather simple, it does not yield a straightforward and unambiguous comparison between c A , m A and g. Since the first setting considered above, namely the case where types are observable, has shown some ambiguity, this in itself is not surprising. Still, based on the above results one would have conjectured that m A >c A >g always obtains for g < 0, while a positive gift-tax elasticity might give rise to some ambiguity. However, a simple inspection of the expression (8) shows that this is not immediately obvious. While the first term on the RHS is then indeed smaller than 1, we cannot determine the sign of the second term. In words, without further specification we cannot assert whether the poor dependent will be worse off than the child of the rich dependent.
To get some more insight, let us look at some special cases. Assume y A =s=0 and that u(x)=x 1Àɛ /(1Àɛ). In that case, the term in brackets on the RHS is positive (negative) for ɛ>(<)1 or equivalently g>(<)0. 15 Note that when ɛ=1 we have
In other words, with a logarithmic utility, g<c A <m A . By continuity, when ɛ >1 is close to 1 we maintain the result that m A >c A >g. For high values of ɛ (or g) the term in brackets is positive but the term (1Àk)(1+g) can be large. On the other way around, for low values of ɛ, the term in brackets is negative and (1Àk)(1+g) can turn negative. The signs of the two terms are then reversed so that the ambiguity persists.
To sum up the content of this section, we show that the possibility of taxing inter vivos gifts contributes to relaxing the self-selection constraint, thus avoiding an undue use of LTC benefits by wealthy altruistic parents. We also show that the optimal policy implies that LTC consumption of the altruistic dependent is generally higher than that of the parent lacking family support. This is always true if the transfer tax is non-distortionary and if it is distortionary but there is not too much complementarity between first and second period consumption. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A taxation of inter vivos gifts can mitigate strategic impoverishment by preventing an undue use of LTC benefits by wealthy altruistic parents. However, it comes at the cost of distorting inter vivos gifts. The cost of this distortion may outweigh the benefits; in that case the taxation of inter vivos gifts is not desirable.
CONCLUSION
One of the pervasive problems with means-tested LTC programs is their inability at avoiding abuses, namely that individuals who can afford directly or through their family paying for their own LTC manage to get through the means tests and thus endanger the sustainability of the system. The purpose of this paper was to present a formalization of what can be called strategic impoverishment and the ways it can be avoided or at least mitigated. Three devices were analyzed. In the first the public benefice is kept so low that altruistic families prefer not to use it for their own dependent. In other words,
since the means-testing is imperfect and can be circumvented it may be necessary to supplement it by a mechanism that relies on self-selection. This is possible as long as the public benefits cannot be supplemented by private resources. Second, we show that if making the testing for means is not too costly the self-selection constraint can be relaxed and the public benefit made more generous. The third avenue we explored was that of introducing an inter vivos gift tax which makes less attractive for well to do elderly to pass their wealth to their children and use the public compensation. While this appears to be intuitively appealing, our results suggest that this instrument may be less effective than one could have expected. We have deliberately abstracted from a number of features, which are to a variable degree empirically relevant within the context of LTC. For example, and as already mentioned in the Introduction, we have assumed that public LTC is necessarily provided in institutions so that it cannot be easily topped up. Note that our qualitative results would remain valid if 'some' topping up were possible. This is true as long as the topping up cannot completely undo a downward distortion in the quality of public care. In reality many governments provide aid to dependent elderly who receive care at home, either from family or from professional caregivers. But eventually most of these individuals will need institutional care and then the phenomenons we describe become relevant. We have also ignored private insurance, but in any event private LTC insurance markets are thin and rather insignificant in most countries (see Pestieau and Ponthiere, 2011; Cremer et al., 2012) . We have also neglected the role of spouses as care-givers and chosen to focus on that of children. All these limitations are for the sake of exposition. Though relevant and interesting, all these aspects do not undermine the basic point we are making.
Finally, to avoid the complexity of multidimensional screening problems, we have assumed that wealth and degree of altruism are perfectly correlated. This has reduced heterogeneity to two types and made the problem tractable. 16 In a fully fledged model one would consider different wealth level for the elderly, different income levels for children and different degrees of altruism. This would yield at least eight types of families, with three dimensions of heterogeneity and a complex set of self-selection constraints. Pestieau and Sato (2009) have explored such a setting but their analysis mainly shows that it is very intricate and not sufficiently tractable for our purpose. To obtain results one would have to make assumptions on the pattern of binding incentive constraints. And as long as the relevant incentive constraints include one from the altruistic rich to the poor one essentially returns to our setting. Observe that while we have assumed for simplicity that the poor is not altruistic, this is not crucial. The setup would be slightly more complicated, but the qualitative results would not change if the poor were also altruistic.
